Story 78 - COMSEC in the Task Force
By Denis Hare OAM BEM
“Without intelligence, one
is vulnerable; without security, one is defenceless”
1
Military Security Terms
Communication Security (COMSEC) is the act of
listening to, copying, or recording transmissions of one's own
official telecommunications to provide material for analysis in
order to determine the degree of security being provided to those
transmissions. COMSEC monitoring by its nature is very selective and
cannot monitor all communications all the time. Furthermore,
COMSEC uncovers lapses only after they have occurred
2.
COMSEC monitoring was conducted by the
1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) starting in early 1967
using a small team from Force Signals 3,
under the direction of the Officer Commanding (OC), of the Task
Force Signal Squadron 4.
The principles for communication security within the 1ATF was stated
in the 104 Sig Sqn Standing Orders, Unit Security Instructions to be
as per Allied Communications Publication ACP 125 Communications
Instructions and Radio Telephone Procedures 5.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is information
gained by the collection and analysis of the electronic signals and
communications of a given target. SIGINT monitoring of enemy
communications was the task of 547 Signal Troop (547 Sig Tp) within
1ATF. The Troop was under operational control of the United
States Army Security Agency’s 509th
Radio Research Group and was assigned to the 303rd
Radio Research Battalion. See the Pronto in South Vietnam website
(http://pronto.au104.org/547Sigs/547Sigs.html), for details of 547
Sig Tp SIGINT work in the Vietnam War.
Operations Security (OPSEC) is another term
coined during the Vietnam War by the US Military because of the
failure of certain combat operations. OPSEC is the process
that identifies all critical information to determine if friendly
actions can be observed by enemy intelligence. Operation Purple
Dragon starting in late 1966 by the US National Security Agency
(NSA) was the origin and development of the United States OPSEC
program during the Vietnam War 6.
Introduction
In the early stages of the Vietnam War
the US intelligence sources warned the following;
“The enemy is conducting a highly sophisticated signal
intelligence operation directed against US and Allied forces in
South Vietnam. He has developed the art of intercept to the
point where his operators receive training materials tailored to
particular US or Allied units against whom they working.”
7
The first US Army COMSEC unit started
in Vietnam in 1960 but was only in an advisory role and one of the
major lessons learned from COMSEC monitoring by the US Army was the
commander’s attitude to the COMSEC analysts’ recommendations, as
follows:
a.
Paid lip service to the analyst’s
recommendations, but took no action.
b. Understood the
weakness but couldn’t make changes due to the complexity of
operations.
c. Maintaining the
same procedures, such as keeping the same callsigns, was poor
COMSEC.
d. Some wanted to
know their mistakes and how to correct them, but they didn’t like
their mistakes made public.
US forces and 1ATF did use secure
telegraph encryption links to pass sensitive information, such as
dates and times for attacks, problems arose when that information
was passed to South Vietnamese military and were discussed over less
secure channels. The consequences of poor COMSEC coupled with
the advanced state of North Vietnamese SIGINT were serious.
The US NSA labelled the careless procedures
‘deadly transmissions’.
(Internet sources)
The value of COMSEC monitoring is
highlighted in the following US Army example:
“At one point, such operations possibly
saved the life of Lieutenant General Creighton W. Abrams, the deputy
chief of the US military command in Vietnam. As Abrams was
about to board a helicopter on a flight north from Saigon to Phu Bai
near Hue, the details of the mission, including the time, altitude,
and route, and the names of the passengers, were transmitted in the
clear. COMSEC monitors overheard the transmission and reported
it immediately. As a result, the flight plan was changed.
North Vietnamese intercept operators also overheard the
transmission. Although Abrams flew by a different route, one
of the other helicopters scheduled to make the trip was not told of
the change. As a result, it was shot at the whole way from
Saigon to Phu Bai – an unusual effort by the VC who did not usually
shoot at helicopters on such flights”.
8
Examples of enemy EW activity, both
jamming and imitative deception was detail in the following extract
from HQ II Field Force, Vietnam from INTSUM No 2, VC Signal
Capacities, for the period 110001H to 112400H Feb 67 9.
Comment:
1ATF was under the operational command of II Field Force, Vietnam,
which was a US Army Corps level command component of the US Military
Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). The II Field Force, Vietnam
HQ was at Long Binh.
1ATF Communications Security Concerns
1ATF started the hard task of setting
up for combat operations at Nui Dat in Jun 1966, and establishing
military control of its Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR).
During late 1966, the US Army provided warnings about enemy SIGINT,
that the enemy had the ability to intercept 1ATF VHF and HF
communications. Also of concern, telephone voice channels were
not encrypted and the 1ATF Telephone Switchboard ‘Ebony’ was
connected by telephones circuits to the 1st Australian
Logistic Support Group (1ALSG) in Vung Tau plus the HQ Australian
Forces Vietnam (AFV) in Saigon and US Army Headquarters/Units, as
well as Vietnamese operated switchboards. The Ebony switchboard
operators warned 1ATF members when being connected to an external
trunk telephone, that the circuit, was not secure.
Concrete evidence for the concern of
security breaches and the enemy SIGINT capabilities was found
repeatedly in the Vietnam War. For example on the 24 October
1966, 5 Platoon, B Company, 5RAR captured a female Viet Cong (VC)
soldier with a US Army radio at an observation post in the Nui Dinh
Mountains on Operation Bathurst. The radio was code named
“Dodo” and its location was pinpointed by the SIGINT work of 547 Sig
Tp. B Company captured a substantial amount of equipment and
documents in the camp that had given the VC a panoramic view of the
province, including the 1ATF base at Nui Dat. An alert soldier of 5
Platoon saw a radio aerial strung between two trees followed the
wire into a cave that lead them eventually to the radio where they
also discovered the female VC clinging to the ceiling of the cave
10.
Photo 2 - 5 Pl, B Coy, 5RAR with female VC just after capture in
the Nui Dinh Mountains
(AWM P02809.012)
Photo 3 – Observation post captured female VC being interrogated at
Nui Dat
(AWM P01404.013)
In January 1968 there was concern with
an Imitative Communication Deception (ICD) which became known as the
“Australian ICD Incident” 11. Details are as
follows:
“A battalion of the 2nd Brigade, US 25th
Infantry Division, was conducting a search and destroy mission, an
intruder entered the battalion command net and for nearly ten hours
was engaged in a running tactical exchange of information. The
intruder, purporting to be of an Australian unit operating near the
2nd Brigade declared that he wanted to establish liaison
so as not to interfere with the battalion’s operations.
The intruder gave his position as “about 23 metres” to the north
of the battalion and stated he was from the “Australian 173rd
Unit” on a separated search and destroy mission. Although the
intruder’s accent seemed to be Australian, although he had entered
the battalion net using the battalion’s callsign, and although his
methods conformed to normal Allied operational transmissions
procedures, his responses to challenges and authentications were
evasive. The battalion commander, suspected an enemy ICD
ruse. The “Australian” could not have been as close as 23
metres, etc. Keeping the “Australian” talking the
battalion checked on other communications and found that there were
no Australian units in Tay Ninh Province and no unit call the
Australian 173rd existed. After plotting
several locations from which the intruder could be transmitting, the
US battalion call in artillery fire on the areas.
The intruder asked that the artillery
cease firing on “friendly forces”. A few more rounds of
“friendly fire” and the “Australian” suddenly broke off and
presumably left the scene. A subsequent examination of the
area uncovered some empty enemy base camp installations but no
Australians.”
Another example one of the 1ATF
battalions in 1969, captured a Viet Cong (VC) who had a AN/PRC-25
radio set tuned to the 1ATF Artillery Command Net on which all fire
orders were transmitted. The AN/PRC-25 had been captured from
US Forces and allowed the enemy when a fire orders were heard enough
warning time to take shelter in their tunnels and escape the
onslaught 12.
7RAR Routine Orders dated 17 May 1967
13 made reference to Telephone
Security issues, as follows:
1966 – Year of the Horse 14
(Photo supplied by John McNeil 103Sigs
21-9)
In mid-November 1966, WO2 Graham
Stewart, a SIGINT specialist from 7 Sig Regt was posted into 552 Sig
Tp, 145 Sig Sqn and assigned three signalmen operators (Raymond
O’Brien, John Noonan and Raymond Price) for COMSEC tasks.
Graham ran a two week course for the three operators on COMSEC
monitoring in Vung Tau. Had O’Brien promoted to L/Cpl, and
moved the team to Nui Dat, which would be known for over the next
five years, as ‘Snoop Troop’.
At Nui Dat they had a small
switchboard (SB-22) wired in parallel to the trunk circuits of the
main switchboard ‘Ebony’ that serviced the Task Force. This
was the start of over five years of taping communications and
reporting breaches on the radio telephone circuits connected to
military forces outside 1ATF. In addition, they also
monitored the many VHF radio nets operating within the Task Force
for breaches.
Raymond O’Brien, remembers one of
their first breaches located on VHF radio, was a battalion
regimental radio operator manning the CP, at night, would from time
to time hold the AN/PRC-25 radio handset near a civilian radio tuned
to a radio station and transmit music to the deployed patrols in the
tactical area of responsibility (TAOR). While being very poor
COMSEC practice, it also was effectively jamming the battalion
command net. Once reported the practice stopped!
WO2 Steward would brief HQ1ATF on
issues and breaches weekly. He remained with the COMSEC
monitoring team until April 67 and then returned to the SIGINT fold
at Nui Dat as the Troop Sergeant Major (TSM) 547 Sig Tp. It
has also been suggested that the original tasking for Graham may
have come from Army HQ (MI8) and the Defence Signals Division (DSD).
1967 - Year of the Goat
Photo 5 - 103 Sig Radio Operators ready to move out with 6RAR on Op
Bribie.
L-R Sig Jim Leslie, Sgt Neil Tonkin (Det Comd) and Cpl John
Chenoweth Feb 1967.
(Photo supplied by Duncan Spencer 103 Sigs 11-19)
The Task Force Commander issued a COMSEC
instruction 15 in January 1967
stating the following:
No details have been located of the
COMSEC reports before Jun 1967. However members of the COMSEC
monitoring team from the 145 Sig Sqn Snoop Troop return to
Australian in May 1967 and were replaced with new team members from
110 Sig Sqn. Also at the same time 104 Sig Sqn replaced
103 Sig Sqn.
In the 104 Sig Sqn war diary for Jun 1967 it details WO1 Alf Poulton (110 Sig Sqn) and Sgt Anstee (104 Sig Sqn) did a COMSEC and Anti Jamming Lecture for V Company (NZ) at the Horseshoe 16
.
Photo 6 – WO1 Alf Poulton (AWM
GIL/67/0697/VN)
WO1 Alf Poulton was an experienced
Signal Centre Supervisor and a veteran of the Korean War and was
tasked with the COMSEC monitoring within the Task Force under the
direction of the OC, 104 Sig Sqn. Alf’s first report “located” in
the war for Monitoring Activities was 15-30 Jun 1967
17. The report is as follows:
Four more COMSEC Reports by WO1 Poulton
are located in the 104 Sig Sqn War Diaries, and can be viewed on the
following links:
July 1967 18
View here.August 1967 19 View here.
September 1967 20 View here.
October 1967 21 View here.
In September 1967 the OC, 104 Sig Sqn,
Major Gerard Lawrence issued a paper titled ‘VC/NVA Electronic
Warfare Capability’ 22 to HQ
1ATF. Gerard in his conclusions stated:
View the full paper here.
The October 1967 COMSEC Report by WO1
Poulton included analysis of the fixed callsign systems used by the
two Task Force Battalions and codes. It also detailed problems
with appointment titles for designating key personnel as inadequate
and was a problem working with US forces who use an entirely
different system.
Annex B to the report addressed the
issues with the fixed callsigns system and codes, as follows:
Major Lawrence’s covering letter to HQ
1ATF and Staff Officer Signals (SO Sigs), AFV strongly supported
changes to the system as a result of the COMSEC Detachments
analysis.
The complete instruction can be view here.
In November 1967, because of the
increased manpower required to man new installations in Vung Tau and
Saigon, 110 Sig Sqn redeployed the COMSEC Detachment at Nui Dat to
Saigon. WO1 Poulton carried out COMSEC duties alone and
his three operators were put on shift in the Major Relay Station
(MRS) and Signal Centre (SIGCEN) 24.
1968 – Year of the Monkey
Photo 7 – Brig Ron Hughes, Commander 1ATF using field telephone from
his forward HQ on Operation
Coburg in Bien Hoa Province Feb 1968 (AWM CRO/68/0072/VN)
This was a busy year for the Task Force and its Signal Squadron with the COMSEC Detachment working in the background without its high profile and skilled WO1 leader from 1967 who had now completed his tour.
The detachment continue to worked at Nui Dat
in 1968 but 104 Sig Sqn and 110 Sig
Sqn War Diaries don’t include copies of their reports and only makes
references in some monthly reports, as follows:
January 1968 25: 110 Sig Sqn
The COMSEC Det was re-constituted this
month at Nui Dat. It is currently deployed on
Operation
Coburg. Note: Detailed in the Det 110 Sig Sqn – Vung Tau
Monthly Report for January 1968.
Sig Rod Barlow recalls doing COMSEC
monitoring tasks on Operation Coburg and comments as follows:
“My job was to maintain a listening watch wearing headphones,
constantly switching channels and recording transmissions on an Akai
reel to reel tape recorder, handwriting an account of the
transmission I deemed might have been a security breach. Logging
the date time and approximate location of the recording so it could
be played back to the OC, 104 Sig Sqn, to determine the seriousness
of the breach.
I remember recording a radio transmission from a young officer who
was conveying information I considered sensitive regarding troop
movements and times etc regarding the deployment of troops to FSPB
Anderson (Operation Coburg). Details were reported.
I must say that the Australian Army’s voice procedures were always
excellent, unlike some procedures portrayed in Hollywood movies.”
July 1968 26: 104 Sig Sqn
The COMSEC Det has been employed during
this month monitoring the Inf Bn and the RR telephone trunk
channels. A noticeable improvement in security has occurred
during the month.
September 1968 27: 110 Sig Sqn
December 1968 28: 104 Sig Sqn
Monitoring has concentrated on the radio
relay circuits to AFV and 1ALSG with attention to 1ATF radio nets
during operations. The standard of combinations security has
continued to improve over the period.
1969 – Year of the Rooster
(Photo
supplied by Peter Diddams 104Sigs 48-16)
The COMSEC monitoring task by 110 Sig Sqn continues at Nui Dat in
1969 but without specialist equipment and problems with the
maintenance of the equipment’s they had. 104 Sig Sqn was
issued with secure VHF Nestor equipment which was used on the
Command Net in parallel with the normal unsecured net. 104 Sig
Sqn and 110 Sig Sqn War Diaries report the number of breaches but
don’t have details in the monthly reports and only makes references
in some, as follows:
January 1969 29:
104 Sig Sqn
Specific attention was given to radio
relay channels during the monitoring period via: EMU, EBONY,
ENSIGN, DEER. No breaches were detected but a noticeable
lack of use of subscribers numbers hampered operators.
13. Due to equipment failures monitoring of VHF nets was
confined to the last week of the month. No breaches were
detected.
110 Sig Sqn
A monthly report on the activities of
this detachment has been submitted to the OC, 104 Sig Sqn.
February 1969 30:
104 Sig Sqn
Specific attention was given to 5RAR
radio nets on that unit’s arrival in theatre. No serious
breaches were recorded.
110 Sig Sqn
At the request of the CSO a Comsec check
is being carried out on the 5RAR VHF nets. Weekly reports to
be submitted to CSO via 104 Sig Sqn. A monthly report on
activities of this section has been submitted to OC, 104 Sig Sqn.
March 1969 31:
104 Sig Sqn
Radio relay channels were again monitored
during March. One breach was reported on the EBONY-ENSIGN
channels. 10. Monitoring of internal telephone systems
at 1ATF gave a nil result. 11. 5RAR VHF radio nets were
monitored, one breach was reported against B Coy.
April 1969 32:
104 Sig Sqn
The Task Force Comd net and Fd Regt Comd
net were monitored throughout the month. Bn nets were also
monitored for a short periods.
September 1969 33:
110 Sig Sqn
Facilities at Nui Dat were improved with
better RR trunk monitoring arrangements, additional recording
facilities and a higher mast for VHF interception.
October 1969 34:
110 Sig Sqn
One tape recorder awaiting parts for
repairs. Replacement machine to be obtained urgently.
December 1969 35:
110 Sig Sqn
One security breach was recorded during
the month and submitted to OC 104 Sig Sqn for appropriate action.
1970 – Year of the Dog
104 Sig Sqn Communications Control
bunker at Nui Dat Nov 1970 (AWM MISC/70/0820/VN)
The COMSEC Team from 110 Sig Sqn
continues to monitor the Task Force radio Nets and radio relay
channels while still having equipment problems and their skills
being questioned, as members of the team were not trained for the
task. In July 1970 the Team was moved into the 104 Sig Sqn
Communications Control bunker for closer supervision and assistance
in their duties 110 Sig Sqn also started monitoring
radio nets and Radio Relay channels at 1ALSG in Vung Tau. 104 Sig
Sqn and 110 Sig Sqn War Diaries don’t have copies of the COMSEC
reports and only makes references in the some monthly reports to the
number of breaches and problems doing the monitoring task, as
follows:
January 1970 36:
110 Sig Sqn
Monitoring activities were curtailed due
to lack of spares for recording equipment. Consequently very
few breaches were reported.
March 1970 37:
110 Sig Sqn
Monitoring of VHF, HF nets and RR
circuits continued. A new tape recorder and additional
supplies of tapes improved the efficiency of the section.
April 1970 38:
110 Sig Sqn
Monitoring of VHF, HF and RR circuits
continued, breaches being reported to 1ATF via 104 Sig Sqn.
May 1970 39:
110 Sig Sqn
The monitoring team at Nui Dat was
increased to three to enable more extensive coverage of VHF, HF and
RR circuits.
June 1970 40:
110 Sig Sqn
The monitoring team are now working more
closely with 104 Sig Sqn. This has enabled better coverage and
quicker action on breaches.
July 1970 41:
104 Sig Sqn
110 Sig Sqn
August 1970 42:
104 Sig Sqn
September 1970 43:
104 Sig Sqn
110 Sig Sqn
October 1970 44:
104 Sig Sqn
110 Sig Sqn
November 1970 45:
104 Sig Sqn
110 Sig Sqn
December 1970 46:
110 Sig Sqn
1971 – Year of the Pig
manning VHF radios in a bunker at
Dat Do 1971. Note the KY-38 secure equipment bottom right.
(AWM PJE/71/0114/VN)
On the 29 March 1971 Radio Troop, 104 Sig
Sqn took over the COMSEC monitoring role from 110 Sig Sqn
47 of all Task Force radio nets and
radio relay channels. 104 Sig Sqn and 110
Sig Sqn War Diaries don’t have copies of any COMSEC monitoring
reports and only makes references to number of breaches, monitoring
equipment maintenance problems and operator training for the task in
OC monthly reports , as follows:
January 1971 48:
104 Sig Sqn
110 Sig Sqn
March 1971 49:
104 Sig Sqn
110 Sig Sqn
April 1971 50:
104 Sig Sqn
Ken Mackenzie was the 104 Sig Sqn COMMS
CON Radio Sgt and gives details on the compromises and other issues
in the 104 Sig Sqn Story 79 “COMSEC, Compromises and Changing
Callsigns” at:
http://www.au104.org/Veteran_Stories/vetstory79.html
110 Sig Sqn
May 1971 51:
104 Sig Sqn
July 1971 53:
104 Sig Sqn
August 1971 54:
104 Sig Sqn
SIGINT not COMSEC
547 Sig Tp was located in a compound within the Task Force Signal Squadron defence sector. The troop was under operational control of the United States Army Security Agency’s 509th Radio Research Group and was assigned to the 303rd Radio Research Battalion so US SIGINT could be relayed to 1ATF. The troop did direct SIGINT support for 1ATF and US forces operating under IIFFV command.
The work of the troop was marked with great secrecy and very few individuals outside it knew of its real role or could access its reporting.
(Photo supplied by Roy Dean 547Sigs 4-2)
Many in 1ATF through the troop was doing
COMSEC monitoring and labelling them 'Cobber Dobbers'. US
forces used the term 'Buddy Fuckers' for their COMSEC teams.
104 Sig Sqn SNCOs were most likely happy
not to correct their young soldiers about the 547 Sig Tp real tasks.
This kept the Radio Operators, which included many national service
signalman, as well as lots of regular soldiers, all with limited
military experience using correct procedures on their Radio tasks.
The 110 Sig Sqn COMSEC team from Snoop
Troop didn’t broadcast their role at Nui Dat also.
Secure Voice Equipment
US
Forces 55
In the field, standard security measures,
such as the manual encryption and decryption of messages, made
communications slower and more complicated, a distinct disadvantage
in the heat of battle. To make things easier, voice security
equipment for stationary and vehicular radios, known as KY-8, began
reaching tactical units in 1965. Unfortunately, this device not only
reduced transmission range but also generated a great deal of heat.
Security equipment for aircraft radios,
designated KY-28, and for manpack or mobile use, KY-38, became
available in 1967. The latter, in combination with the AN/PRC-77
radio, weighed fifty pounds, a significant burden for the foot
soldier.
Photo 12A – Nestor TSEC/KY-8 Photo 12B – Nestor
TSEC/KY-28 (with KYK-28 Key Gun).
Photo 12C – Nestor
TSEC/KY-38 (with KYK-28 Key Gun) - (Internet sources).
Australian Task Force
1ATF received the first KY-38 equipment’s
for the VHF Command Net in April 1969 and were deployment with the
three Battalion 104 Sig Sqn detachments and the SAS Sqn 152 Sig Sqn
Detachment 56. The
equipment was used on a “demand’ basis and was proved quite
successful. By 1971 the VHF Command Net Secure was important
to Command and Control of the Task Force.
Conclusion
COMSEC is a balancing act in battle
between saving lives and taking the fight to the enemy. During
the battle little SIGINT is gained by the enemy that has long term
value. However it would appear our combat troops were trained
well and used adequate COMSEC practices in most situations.
The COMSEC monitoring team from 110 Sig
Sqn was only as good as the expertise of its members and the
detachment leader. Clearly WO2 Graham Stewart and WO1 Alf
Poulton at the beginning of the COMSEC monitoring in 1967 were most
experienced. Poulton report in October 1967 is a good example
of his skills which was instrumental in changing the callsign schema
used by 1ATF battalions. After 1967 team leaders and members,
appeared to not have the high level skills and operational
experience required for the task. In addition, the team lacked
specialist equipment used by the US Forces for their task.
However because monitoring was undertaken of the 1ATF
communications, breaches reported and passed back to units
commanders, this helped maintain adequate COMSEC within 1ATF.
Did the US NSA monitor our Task Force communications? No
details have been located but it is assumed they did.
Secure Voice Equipment used on the 1ATF
Secure VHF Command Net in the final years of the deployment would
have helped reduce the risks of high level COMSEC breaches.
However information from the secure net could have been passed
down into sub units. Therefore there was always a COMSEC risk
within the Task Force when a skilled enemy in SIGINT was at work.
Australian trunk telephone systems were
never encrypted and our systems manually connected into most Allies
Systems in the Vietnam theatre. It was very wise to warn
users it was unsecure, as this was a high use media, which many
members of the Australian Force didn’t understand the security
risks. However it should be noted that the US Army command
telephone link from HQ1ATF to HQIIFFV were encrypted by 1970.
No details of OPSEC being conducted by
AFV or 1ATF, was located in the research for this story, like the
NSA Operation Purple Dragon. As the Australian force operated as
part of the US force it must be concluded that OPSEC for the
Australian force was assessed also under Operation Purple Dragon.
However unlike the US Army, only very limited access for Vietnamese
was allow at our combat base Nui Dat. This was a real
advantage in its physical security. However, Vietnamese
civils were employed at 1ALSG at Vung Tau and this may have been an
issue.
References:
1. An ancient
military axiom.
2. PURPLE
DRAGON: The Origin and Development of the United States OPSEC
Program (Page 13).
3. Force
Signals (145 Sig Sqn replaced by 110 Sig Sqn) provided the
communications rear of 1ATF including back to Australian.
4. Task Force
Signals (103 Sig Sqn replaced by 104 Sig Sqn) provided the
communications for HQ1ATF.
5. AWM95-6-2-3
104 Sig Sqn - Standing Orders, Unit Security Instructions (Annex D)
paragraph 27.
6. PURPLE
DRAGON: The Origin and Development of the United States OPSEC
Program (Page V).
7. Book:
Body of Secrets (Page 304) by James Bamford
8. Book:
Body of Secrets (Page 306) by James Bamford
9. AWM95-6-4-13
145 Sig Sqn – Extract from HQ2FFV INTSUM No 42, VC Signal
Capacities.
10.
Photo details at
https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C394913
11. Book: Southeast Asia ‘Working Against the Tide”
(Pages 8 to 11) by Wolfe, Schmidt and Thompson
12. Signals Swift and Sure
(Page 236) by John Blaxland
13. AWM95-7-7-3 7RAR (Page
115) Telephone Security
14. Based on emails from
Robert Hartley AM and telephone interview with Raymond O’Brien Feb
2020.
15. AWM95-1-4-24 HQ1ATF –
COMSEC Instruction (Page 176-178)
16. AWM95-6-2-3 104 Sig Sqn
- COMSEC and Anti Jamming Lecture for V Company (NZ)
17. AWM95-6-2-4 104 Sig Sqn
– COMSEC Report 15-30 June 1967
18. AWM95-6-2-5 104 Sig Sqn
– COMSEC Report July 1967
19. AWM95-6-2-6 104 Sig Sqn
– COMSEC Report August 1967
20. AWM95-6-2-7 104 Sig Sqn
– COMSEC Report September 1967
21. AWM95-6-2-8 104 Sig Sqn
– COMSEC Report October 1967
22. AWM95-6-2-7 104 Sig Sqn
– VC/NVA Electronic Warfare Capability Paper
23. AWM95-1-4-68 HQ 1ATF –
GS Instruction 27/67 – Inf Bn Fixed Callsigns – See pages 58-60
24. AWM95-6-3-7 110 Sig Sqn
– November 1967 Monthly Report, COMSEC team redeployed to Saigon.
See Para 9.
25. AWM95-6-3-9 110 Sig Sqn
– January 1968 Det Vung Tau Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 7.
26. AWM95-6-2-16 104 Sig
Sqn – July 1968 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 8.
27. AWM95-6-3-17 110 Sig
Sqn – September 1968 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 36.
28. AWM95-6-2-21 104 Sig
Sqn – December 1968 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 6.
29. AWM95-6-2-22 104 Sig
Sqn – January1969 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 12
and AWM95-6-3-21 110 Sig Sqn – January 1969 Monthly Report, COMSEC
Para 20.
30. AWM95-6-2-23 104 Sig
Sqn – February 1969 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 8
and AWM95-6-3-22 110 Sig Sqn –
February 1969 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 32.
31. AWM95-6-2-24 104 Sig
Sqn – March 1969 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 9.
32. AWM95-6-2-25 104 Sig
Sqn – April 1969 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 10.
33. AWM95-6-3-29 110 Sig
Sqn – September 1969 Monthly Report details COMSEC Para 11.
34. AWM95-6-3-30 110 Sig
Sqn – October 1969 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 15.
35. AWM95-6-3-31 110 Sig
Sqn – December 1969 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 16.
36. AWM95-6-3-32 110 Sig
Sqn – January 1970 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 7d.
37. AWM95-6-3-33 110 Sig
Sqn – March 1970 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 8d.
38. AWM95-6-3-34 110 Sig
Sqn – April 1970 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 11.
39. AWM95-6-3-35 110 Sig
Sqn – May 1970 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 8.
40. AWM95-6-3-36 110 Sig
Sqn – June 1970 Monthly Report, COMSEC Para 8
41. AWM95-6-2-40 104 Sig
Sqn – July 1970 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 5
and AWM95-6-3-37 110 Sig Sqn – July 1970 Monthly Report COMSEC Para
19, 20 and 21.
42. AWM95-6-2-41 104 Sig
Sqn – August 1970 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 5
and AWM95-6-3-38 110 Sig Sqn – August 1970 Monthly Report COMSEC
Para 20 and 21.
43. AWM95-6-2-42 104 Sig
Sqn – September 1970 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 7
and AWM95-6-3-39 110 Sig Sqn – September 1970 Monthly Report COMSEC
Para 18g.
44. AWM95-6-2-44 104 Sig
Sqn – October 1970 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 6
and AWM95-6-3-40 110 Sig Sqn – October 1970 Monthly Report COMSEC
Para 16g.
45. AWM95-6-2-45 104 Sig
Sqn – November 1970 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 6
and AWM95-6-3-41 110 Sig Sqn – November 1970 Monthly Report COMSEC
Para 14g.
46. AWM95-6-3-42 110 Sig
Sqn – December 1970 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 16h
47. AWM95-6-2-48 104 Sig
Sqn – 29 March 1971 110 Sig Sqn COMSEC team at 1ATF replaced by 104
Sig Sqn Radio Troop personnel.
48. AWM95-6-2-46 104 Sig
Sqn – January 1971 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 25, 26 and 27
and AWM95-6-3-43 – January 1971 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 16i
49. AWM95-6-2-49 104 Sig
Sqn – March 1971 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 30, 31 and 32
and AWM95-6-3-45 – March 1971 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 17k.
50. AWM95-6-2-50 104 Sig
Sqn – April 1971 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 18, 18 and 20
and AWM95-6-3-46 110 Sig Sqn – April 1971 Monthly Report COMSEC Para
27.
51. AWM95-6-2-51 104 Sig
Sqn – May 1971 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 21, 22 and 23.
52. AWM95-6-2-52 104 Sig
Sqn – June 1971 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 26 and 27.
53. AWM95-6-2-53 104 Sig
Sqn – July 1971 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 20 and 21
54. AWM95-6-2-54 104 Sig
Sqn – August 1971 Monthly Report COMSEC Para 22
55. Getting the Message
Through, The Vietnam Conflict Chapter X Page 369 by Rebecca Robbins
Raines See https://history.army.mil/books/30-17/S_10.htm
56. AWM95-6-2-25 104 Sig
Sqn – April 1969 Monthly Report details KY-38s issued for secure
communications.