

CONFIDENTIAL104 Sig Sqn  
NUI DAT

9 Nov 67

R723-1-2

List C  
HQ 1 ATF (12)  
SO Sigs AFV (4)COMSEC MONITORING REPORT - OCT 67

1. Attached is the Oct 67 comsec monitoring report. Comments are given below.

Disclosure of Forward HQ

2. Reference para 2a. The EBONY FORWARD switchboard does not open until several hours after the forward HQ is established. By this time, the fact that a forward HQ has been deployed must be obvious from the more readily intercepted TF command net voice.

3. "A" suffixes are used for rear element stations, including TF HQ rear, and this is more likely to disclose that a forward HQ has been deployed. As from 1 Dec the use of the "A" suffix will be discarded and a separate callsign issued for rear elements. Since new stations on the TF command net are not unusual and do not necessarily relate to a move of the HQs this will improve communication security.

4. The use of EBONY FORWARD may now be a comsec weakness. A separate designator could be used however:

a. The use of a new designator will be unusual and will relate to the move of the HQ. Thus no additional security is afforded.

b. The enemy could determine that EBONY FORWARD is in use in two ways:

(1) By chance induction, cross connection etc resulting in a forward RR circuit eventually being unintentionally heard by an agent in a rear area such as Vung Tau or Saigon.

(2) By direct intercept of the multi channel RR bearer.

c. It is considered that these are reasonable risks.


5. It is not proposed to change EBONY FORWARD designator.

Appointment Titles

6. Reference para 2d. The present system of designating key personnel is inadequate and it results in confusion when working with US forces who use an entirely different system. A paper will be submitted to HQ 1 ATF on appointment titles.

Codes

7. Reference Annex B para 5. A 1 ATF GS instruction has been prepared to standardize callsigns used by infantry battalions of 1 ATF.

  
(G.J. Lawrence)  
Major  
Officer Commanding

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Comsec Det  
532 Sig Tp  
NUI DAT

Nov 67

OC 104 Sig Sqn

COMSEC MONITORING REPORT - OCT 67

1. The following nets were monitored during the reporting period:

- a. Radio Relay Channels
  - Ebony - Ebony Fwd 1 - 9 Oct (Op KENMORE)
  - Ebony - Deer - Emu - Plantation 1 Oct  
10 - 31 Oct
- b. 1 ATF Comd Net 1 - 11 Oct (Op KENMORE)  
17 Oct  
23 Oct  
26 - 31 Oct (Op SANTA FE)
- c. 2 RAR Comd Net 1 - 9 Oct  
20 - 21 Oct
- d. 7 RAR Comd Net 1 - 9 Oct
- e. B Coy 2 RAR Coy Net 23 - 24 Oct
- f. B Coy 7 RAR Coy Net 23 - 24 Oct
- g. A Sqn 3 Cav Regt Net 2 Oct  
18 Oct

2. Ebony - Ebony Forward. No serious disclosures recorded. However information of value to a monitoring agency was revealed as follows:

- a. Identity of the forward HQ was evident by the use of the switchboard designator EBONY FORWARD. EBONY is well known as the telephone exchange at HQ 1 ATF. It is suggested that a different designator be allotted to the forward HQ during future operations.
- b. Too much unnecessary talk was evident over this circuit. In some cases conversations up to eight minutes duration consisted of nothing but idle chatter. Information of some security value was given during these conversations as shown in the following examples which clearly revealed that the forward HQ 1 ATF was located on a beach. eg.
  - "Is it a good day for swimming out there?"
  - "He's gone down to the beach".
  - "He's having a swim at the moment."
- c. The approximate duration of the operation was revealed in the following conversations which were recorded on 4 Oct:
  - "Was thinking of coming out Friday." (6 Oct)

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"He wants to come out Monday". (9 Oct)

- d. Frequent use was made of unauthorised means to qualify appointment titles: eg. (Title) mini minor. (Title) 2 or 3 etc. Where suitable titles do not exist, it is recommended that pre-arranged substitutes be adopted for intra-unit use only.
- e. Several instances of obscene language were recorded on this circuit. No examples are given in this report.
3. Ebony - Deer - Emu Circuits. The following sensitive information was discussed in separate transmissions:
  - a. Location and movements of VIP.
  - b. Information known to be classified by the subscribers concerned.
  - c. Reference to a pending battalion operation.
  - d. Mention of a classified codeword for an operation.
4. Examples are given in Annex A.
5. 1 ATF Command Net. Considering the large volume of traffic recorded on this net, the general standard of security and procedure was commendable. Very few disclosures of any significance were recorded. Two examples are given in Annex A.
6. Codes. During October a study was made of the existing fixed call sign system and field codes. The essential points are included in this report as Annex B.
7. Unit Nets. No significant information recorded.

*A.G. Poulton*  
W01  
A.G. POULTON  
OC COMSEC DET

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Date Time	Transmission	Comments
<p>201413</p> <p>c.</p> <p>a.</p> <p>c.</p> <p>a.</p> <p>c.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Radio Relay Channels</u></p> <p><u>(Caller not identified) - to S&amp;T Rep Ext 169.</u></p> <p><u>I don't know how classified this info is.</u></p> <p><u>Yes it is very classified.</u></p> <p><u>So I don't know that these colours - orange, white and blue - Orange is dieso white -- blue is water based.</u></p> <p>Yes</p> <p>It comes in 55 (?) gal lots - etc -----</p>	<p>Attention should not be directed to classified info. Followed by immediate discussion increases the possibility of compromise.</p>
<p>231447.</p> <p>c.</p> <p>a.</p> <p>c.</p> <p>a.</p> <p>c.</p> <p>a.</p>	<p>Sgt HOFFMAN <u>7 RAR</u> - VAMPIRE (8 Fd Amb).</p> <p>Bloke by name of CHARLTON to see the surgeon.</p> <p>When do you want him to see the surgeon?</p> <p>Tomorrow.</p> <p>Can't see him tomorrow. Can fit him in on <u>Thursday</u>.</p> <p>That's no good. They're <u>going out on ops</u>.</p> <p>Hold on ----- can fit him in at 1400 hrs tomorrow.</p>	<p>A serious breach. Previously reported.</p>
<p>241115</p>	<p><u>Capt LEBONSFIELD (EBONY 21C) - Deer Ext 228</u></p> <p><u>(Msg for Lt EDDY) -- Tell him its reference payment for the SAS party.</u></p> <p><u>(Deer) --- he wont be back before 4 O'clock. As a matter of fact he's down your way. He's down at the TASK FORCE with the general. ---</u></p> <p><u>They're staying there for lunch and coming back on the afternoon flight --</u></p>	<p>VIP location and movement.</p>

Date Time	Transmission	Comments
251517	Maj BOYLE - Maj JOYCE (8 Fd Amb fwd) ----- (Ref bn not disclosed) ----- I think they were all pissed last night. Weren't they all having a farewell party <u>before going out in the bush?</u>	Confirms entry at 231447
301421 c. a. c.	Sgt CAMPBELL (PR) - (not recorded) Tell the Colonel we got plenty of film on --- er ---- <u>SANTA FE?</u> On <u>HASLUCK.</u>	SANTA FE was a classified codeword until 3 Nov.

1 ATF COMD NET

Date Time	Call		Transmission	Comments
	To	From		
301625	5 3	3 5	Say again <u>point of origin.</u> <u>MISSISSIPI, NILE, DARLING - call it what you like.</u>	Reveals alternatives for point of origin. Would assist in compromise during future transmissions.
311541	3	5	C/S 2, 22, 24 BEETLE right 1.1 down 2.7. At this location they have come across a <u>track</u> that has been used in the past 36 hours by personnel on foot. They <u>intend setting up an ambush.</u>	Intentions.



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ANNEX B to  
COMSEC REPORT OCT 67

CODES

1. Authentication. Users and operators appear reluctant to employ this code when its use is warranted as a security measure. No instance of its use was recorded during October and examples are rare for preceding months. With the known increase in electronic warfare activities by the enemy and the increased possibility of imitative deception on radio circuits, greater emphasis should be placed on the employment of the Authentication Code during operations. When a new station joins the net or an existing station makes a transmission with an unrecognized voice, the station should be asked to authenticate.
2. Operation Code. This code has been used successfully when required. No instance of misuse or compromise has been recorded.
3. Numeral Code. Satisfactory. The code has been used correctly and no compromise has been detected. The main security hazard is when the point of origin code is related to the numeral code in separate transmissions. This practice has been eliminated in this theatre but units arriving in the future should be briefed on the correct use of the code.
4. Point of Origin Code. The simplicity of this code makes it very vulnerable to compromise. Comsec monitoring has shown that the reference points can constantly be compromised within one or two hours unless users are extremely careful to incorporate a minimum of geographical or other identifying data. The point of origin code has not been used for overnight or static locations. New units must be made aware of the short term security this code offers.
5. Fixed Callsigns. The use of permanent fixed callsigns within a unit requires investigation under the current concept of guerilla warfare. The Australian battalions in 1 ATF have individual variations which serve to identify the battalion. In addition, companies or platoons operation independantly are identified thus revealing the size of the force concerned.

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